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Abstract
In this paper, we examine the stock market reaction to industrial disasters. We consider
an original sample of 64 explosions in chemical plants and refineries worldwide over the
period 1990-2005. A quarter of the accidents resulted in a toxic release, and half of them
caused at least one death or serious injury. On average, petrochemical firms in our sample
experience a drop in their market value of 1.3% over the two days immediately following
the disaster. Using multivariate analysis, we show that this loss is significantly related to
the seriousness of the accident as measured by the number of casualties and by chemical
pollution: each casualty corresponds to a loss of $164 million and a toxic release to a loss of
$1 billion.
JEL Classification: G14, Q27, Q51.
Keywords: Technological Risk, Event Study, Environmental Liability, Disclosure, In-
surance.
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1 Introduction
Chemical disasters are one of the major technological risks that modern societies face. Such
accidents directly affect firms’ revenues by disrupting their production process, but they also
generate negative externalities on health and ecosystems. Catastrophes like the explosion in
Seveso (Italy) in 1976, the release of toxic gas in Bhopal (India) in 1984, or the explosion of a
BP refinery in Texas (US) in 2005 clearly illustrate the enormous risk potential of petrochemical
plants. These catastrophic accidents were very well publicized, but they are only the visible part
of the iceberg. According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 8% of the petrochemical
facilities in the US reported at least one accident over the period 1994-2000. The total number
of accidents during that period was nearly 2,000 and half of them caused employee or public
injuries ( [10]). In the European Union, between 1971 and 2005, there were about 30 industrial
accidents that each resulted in 25 or more fatalities.1
In this paper, we examine the stock market’s reaction to chemical disasters from 1990 to 2005.
This subject is particularly relevant because many scholars have suggested (see, for example,
[37]; [7]) that the threat of a severe market penalty can complement government regulation by
providing incentives to comply with safety and environmental standards and/or to innovate in
order to prevent accidents. To carry out our analysis, we build an original sample of the 64
explosions in chemical plants and refineries that occurred worldwide from 1990 to 2005. The
software program Factiva (which covers more than 10,000 news sources) was used to search in
a systematic way for the press articles mentioning publicly traded companies responsible for
disasters. Also, this search allowed us to build a number of useful variables measuring the social
consequences of each disaster, such as their effect on health and on the environment.
A few studies, similar to us, have examined the financial implications of industrial disasters
with environmental consequences. [26] and [34] consider relatively small samples of pollution
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accidents in the U.S. in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In their analysis, pollution accidents are
associated with a significant drop in stock returns. In contrast, Jones and Rubin (2001) do not
find significant results by looking at a sample of 14 accidents that occurred in the oil and power
sector between 1970 and 1992. Finally, a number of case studies have investigated the stock
market response to catastrophes such as the Exxon-Valdez oil spill and the Bhopal chemical
explosion (e.g., [18]; and [35]).2 Their results indicate that in the first month following those
two major accidents, abnormal losses range between -12% (for the Exxon-Valdez oil spill) and
-30% (for the Bhopal explosion).3 Another strand of literature has examined the stock market
response to the publication of the U.S. Toxic Release Inventory (TRI), a publicly available
database that contains information on toxic chemical releases and waste management activities
reported annually by industries ( [15]; [27]; [25]). The seminal paper of [15] shows that the average
stock market loss over six days following the publication of the U.S. TRI in 1989 is equal to -
1.20%. Several studies have investigated the consequences of judicial actions for environmental
violations on stock market value in the U.S.4 Finally, [9] study the average stock market drop
following violations of existing Korean environmental laws and regulations. Interestingly, they
confirm previous evidence that stock market penalties are much higher in developing countries
( [8]; [14]).
One contribution of this paper is to analyze the financial consequences of industrial disasters
and the determinants of the investor reaction over a longer (and more recent) time span, and
to do so for various countries. Investigating the stock market response to recent industrial
accidents is of particular interest, since new regulations aimed at preventing such disasters and
improving firm transparency have been introduced. Moreover, it is equally interesting to study
cross-country samples because one can speculate that differences in regulation across countries
influence stock market response.
In the first part of the econometric analysis, we assess the average market value losses in-
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curred by shareholders using an event-study methodology. We expect investors to react to a
disaster because many costs, such as liabilities for personal injuries or environmental penalties,
are uninsured or barely insurable. Moreover, after an accident, stakeholders are likely to modify
their belief about the safety of that particular plant or of the firm as whole. This may lead
to an increase in insurance premiums, the expectation of tighter government regulation, or the
worsening of relations with customers, employees, suppliers and investors. Our results indicate
that firms do incur a financial loss after a chemical disaster. On an accident-by-accident basis,
statistical significance is difficult to detect because of the volatility in firms’stock returns. Three
out of four accidents in our sample are associated with negative abnormal returns, but the losses
are statistically significant for only one-fourth of the accidents. At the same time, we are able to
draw conclusions about the overall significance of our results. On average, cumulative abnormal
returns are significantly different from zero and amount to 1.3% over the two days immediately
following the accident.
In the second part of the econometric analysis, we attempt to explain the determinants of the
drop in market value incurred by each firm using multivariate regression analysis. We find that
the number of fatalities and serious injuries as well as the occurrence of pollution significantly
aggravate the magnitude of the decrease in the first days after the accident. We also provide
estimates of the market loss associated with each fatality and with the occurrence of pollution:
one fatality or serious injury causes an additional loss of approximately $164 million, whereas a
toxic release corresponds to an average loss between $190 million and $1.82 billion. This large
confidence interval is not surprising, given that, due to a lack of available information, we use a
dummy which controls for the occurrence of a toxic release, but not for its severity. Finally, we
also document that, over six months after the accident, a toxic release represents an additional
loss of 12% (statistically significant at the 5% level). This result may follow from a delayed
reaction (that is, stock markets do not fully and immediately incorporate the losses) and/or a
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premium due to an increase of the perceived riskiness of the firm.
2 The data
2.1 The sample of accidents
The aim of this paper is to provide robust empirical evidence on the stock market reaction to
chemical disasters. Unfortunately, there is no global, publicly available list of the major chemical
disasters that disclose the names of companies responsible for disasters.5 To identify the chemical
disasters, we compiled a corpus of print media articles for the period 1990-2005.
A systematic search using the software Factiva was carried out. This software covers all
major newspapers and publications in the world (including major publications such as The Wall
Street Journal or The Financial Times). We selected all news stories written in English (over
10,000). The search was carried out using two keywords: “explosion” and “chemical plant”,
and excludes all accidents reported by newspapers before 1990 and after 2005. Using the two
keywords, we started with about 200 events. Of these, two-thirds were eliminated because
they did not involve publicly traded companies (they concerned state-owned companies, illegal
factories, etc.). Datastream, which covers more than 75% of publicly listed companies in the
world, was used to identify a sample of 38 publicly traded companies responsible for 64 accidents.
The list of accidents and a brief description is presented in the Table 2. The firms are listed on
the stock markets of ten developed countries (Australia, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands,
Norway, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom, the United States) and two emerging countries
(South Africa and South Korea).
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2.2 The features of accidents
The distinctive characteristics of accidents are also drawn from print media. We consider indirect
speeches by local populations, public authorities, unions and company spokespersons, environ-
mental interest groups, citizens’ groups, fire brigades, the police, etc., as reported in newspaper
articles. Table 3 reports some descriptive statistics.
Human harm. This variable measures the number of injured that were listed as “in serious
condition” and the number of fatalities due to the accident. More than half of the accidents
resulted in at least one fatality and a serious injury. The average number of fatalities and serious
injuries is 2.6.
Pollution. This variable is measured by a dummy set equal to one if we have information
that the accident resulted in a toxic release. Chemical releases are classified as toxic on the
basis of the statements issued by the authorities, environmentalist groups, and the companies
themselves. For instance, the authorities state that “no dangerous chemicals were released into
the air” (March 1992, Dow Chemical); or that “more than 10 tons of poisonous chemicals were
released” (February 1993, Hoescht). In one quarter of the accidents, the chemical release was
toxic enough to contaminate the environment.6
Reputation. The firm reputation is measured by the number of similar accidents previously
experienced by each firm since 1980.7 In the absence of perfect information, an accident consti-
tutes an informative signal that investors use to infer the environmental riskiness of each firm.
Thus, stock market response should depend on the current accident but also on the previous
safety and environmental records of firms.
Size. The firm size is measured by the log of its market value (in 2005 US$) on the day
before the accident. In percentage terms, the effect of an equally sized accident on the stock
market value should be lower for big firms. The impact of an accident in a small firm might also
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be more severe because shares of small firms are less liquid and because small firms do not have
the same opportunity as big firms to reallocate their production across plants in order to fulfill
their contracts in the event of an accident.
Abnormal Media Coverage. This variable is obtained by computing the ratio between
the number of headlines that mention the firm in the twenty days before a disaster and the total
number of headlines received in the previous year. This variable is meant to capture the visibility
of the firm at the time of the incident. Using the ratio should control for the fact that some firms
are more present in the media. This variable is equal to 5.5% on average, and varies between 0
and 20%. The visibility of the firm may have an effect on stock returns through various channels.
It might increase the number of informed investors about the disaster. It could also proxy for
other news announcements and confounding effects at the time of disasters, which may crowd
out the effect of accident news on stock markets. We also use a dummy variable set equal to one
if the accident was mentioned in either The Wall Street Journal or The Financial Times.
Oil versus Chemical Sector. A dummy is set equal to one if the company belongs to
the chemical sector and zero if it belongs to the oil sector. In our sample, 68% of accidents are
caused by chemical firms.
Time. Accidents appear uniformly distributed over the period 1990-2005. Two five-year
dummy variables are used for accidents that occurred between 1995 and 1999, and for accidents
that occurred between 2000 and 2005. The effect of time is difficult to predict. On the one hand,
since in most developed countries transparency has increased, accidents might have a lower
informational content.8 On the other hand, public concern about pollution might aggravate
stock market losses due to reputation damage and legal implications.
Countries. Four dummy variables are introduced to control for accidents that occurred in
the United Kingdom, in continental Europe, in Japan and in emerging countries (the reference
variable corresponds to accidents that occurred in North-America).9 We expect structural dif-
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ferences between countries to be relevant due to differences in environmental liability rules, in
the stringency of regulation (see [16]), and in legal origin (see [30]).
3 Equity returns losses following chemical disasters
We expect stock market value to decrease for numerous reasons. The most obvious costs of an
accident consist in damage to fixed assets (including property), loss of inventory, raw materials
and finished products, and business interruption. As firms carry insurance against most of these
losses, the decline in firm value should be mainly related to costs that are barely insurable, such
as liabilities for personal injuries or environmental penalties.10 Moreover, accidents represent a
signal about the riskiness of a firm. After an accident, stakeholder and investors update their
belief about the safety of that particular plant or of the entire firm. Consequently, market capi-
talization can be affected by portfolio rebalancing. Insurance companies may increase insurance
premiums and require more stringent safety standards; public authorities may reinforce the reg-
ulations and thereby raise the cost of regulatory compliance for firms; customers and suppliers
may move away from firms; analysts and investors may view the earnings of firms riskier than
previously expected. Finally, firms will have to spend on advertising in order to improve their
public image.
In this section, we provide evidence of average equity value losses, both in the short-term
and in the long-term. After presenting our results, subsection 3.4 relates our findings to the ones
obtained by previous literature.
3.1 The event study methodology
To examine stock price behavior related to explosions in petrochemical plants, we performed a
daily event study as implemented by [31]. The change in equity value associated with an explosion
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in a petrochemical plant is taken as an unbiased estimate of the total financial consequences of
the accident (all expected uninsured future costs).11
The market model is applied to describe the behavior of asset returns and to separate out
changes in value caused by overall market effects from those changes caused by the accident
itself. The normal relation between the observed returns of a given stock i at time t, Ri,t, and
the market returns at the same time, Rm,t, is given by: Ri,t = αi + βiRm,t + εi,t. The term
βiRm,t is the portion of the return to security i on day t that is due to marketwide factors. The
parameter αi measures that part of the average daily return on the stock that is not due to
market movements. Lastly, εi,t measures that part of the change in the value of firm’s i stock on
day t that is not due to either movements in the market or to the firm’s average daily return. On
the day of an event (here the explosion in a chemical plant or in an oil refinery), the deviation
in an individual stock’s daily return from what is expected based on the previous equation, that
is, the prediction error, is taken as an unbiased estimate of the financial effects of the event. Let
ARi,t = Ri − α̂i − β̂iRm,t stand for this abnormal return or prediction error where α̂i and β̂i
are respectively, the estimates of αi and βi.
12 Abnormal returns are computed given the market
model parameters estimated with OLS through the period [-190; -10] in event time. Event time
is days relative to the accident date.
Following [31], we calculate an individual t-statistic for each firm’s abnormal return for each
accident-day. Moreover, the average abnormal daily return for all accidents in the sample, AARt,
is calculated along with its statistical significance. The sum of the individual t-statistics follows
a distribution that is asymptotically normal with mean zero and variance equal to the number of
observations. The z-statistic for the average is then the sum of the individual t-statistics divided
by the square root of the number of observations.13 To examine the average loss incurred by
shareholders, we also look at the cumulative average abnormal returns since the accident date,
CAARt ( [31]). Finally, we compute the average abnormal shareholder loss (SLt) due to the
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chemical explosions by multiplying the market value on the day before the accident with the
cumulated abnormal returns up to t days after the accident. That is, SLt = (
∑N
i=1 SLi,[0;+t])/N ,
where SLi,[0;+t] = CARi,[0;+t]×MVi,−1 and MVi,−1 represents the market value of firm i on the
day before the accident (in billion dollars).
3.2 Short-term evidence
Figure 1 and Table 5 (Panel A) report cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARt) aggregated
across all accidents (N = 64).14 On average, shareholders suffer a significant loss of 0.76% on
the day of the accident, and of 1.26% the following day. All these estimates are statistically
significant at the 1% level.15
It could be argued that the CAARt metric is difficult to interpret since bigger firms should
incur a lower drop in percentage terms. Therefore, in unreported results, in addition to the
equally-weighted CAARt, we also computed the value-weighted CAARt (see, [11]). In the short-
term, the CAARt remain significantly negative, and do not change substantially the magnitude
of the loss (the drop is less than 1.5% in the first two days).
About three-quarter of the firms experienced negative abnormal returns in the day following
the accident, but only ten accidents caused abnormal returns significant at the 5% level. Thus, in
Panel B, we consider only the accidents which cause statistically significant negative CARi,t<10
at the 5% level (N = 10). On average, on the day of the accident, shareholders suffer an
equity loss of of 2.08%, which is significant at the 1% level. The cumulative returns for the
following day are equal to -3.46% (t-stat is equal to -5.10). It should be noticed that on average
investor’s reactions to the accidents considered by Panel B tend to persist for a longer period: the
cumulative returns after twenty days are -5.26% (t-stat is equal to -2.39). In Panel C, CARi,t are
aggregated across accidents which do not cause, on an accident-by-accident basis, statistically
significant negative CARi,t<10 at the 5% level (N = 54). We still find that for the remaining 54
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firms cumulative average abnormal returns are negative and significant at the 5% level on the
day of the accident and in the following day (-0.51% and -0.84%, respectively). Although stock
returns are volatile and, consequently, significance is difficult to detect, we provide evidence of
an adverse and genuine effect of the accidents.
Over two days, the average decline in market value is equal to $306 million. Given that
accidents differ in their seriousness, so does the shareholder loss. Accordingly, the standard
deviation is equal to $1.8 billion, while the average loss is above $1 billion for 10% of the
accidents. Cross-sectional and long-term evidence in the subsequent sections is intended to
investigate whether the magnitude of the losses is related to the seriousness of the accidents,
which we measure by the number of casualties and the occurrence of toxic release.
3.3 Long-term evidence
In the empirical finance literature, evidence that stock prices continue to drift following corporate
news announcements is usually attributed to two main effects: a delayed reaction and/or a
premium for some unidentified risk (Bernard and Thomas, 1989). In particular, in the very
short-term, investors might be slow to recognize the extent of the loss due to legal uncertainty
or to lack of information about the extent of the damage.16 Moreover, if the risk profile of a firm
is affected by an accident, abnormal returns might shift downward permanently.17
Our results indicate that within six months, CAARt remain negative and increase slightly in
magnitude, although they are not significantly different from zero, which might be due to high
volatility in the long-term (see Table 5). In order to deal with the low power of event-studies
as well as problems of model specification in the long-term, we look at the differences in the
cumulative abnormal returns across sub-samples of accidents, as suggested by [28].
Table 6 reports cumulative average abnormal returns in the first six months after the acci-
dent for various sub-samples of accidents. Interestingly, we find that the long-term pattern of
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cumulative abnormal returns differs substantially according to the seriousness of the accident.
Differences in long-term cumulative average abnormal returns across sub-samples show clear
evidence that the most serious accidents are associated with abnormal return losses of higher
magnitude (see Table 6). In particular, the CAARt within six months of accidents with fatali-
ties and serious injuries are about 3% higher than the ones that did not cause human harm (the
difference is significant at the 1% level). Moreover, the CAARt of polluting accidents are about
7% higher than that of non-polluting accidents (the difference is significant at the 1% level).
Interestingly, these differences increase over time, therefore suggesting that in the short-term,
the response of investors to a serious accident might not be complete. Since univariate com-
parisons do not account for additional factors that might simultaneously affect the response of
investors, in section 4.2, we investigate whether this result is corroborated by multivariate and
cross-sectional regression analysis.
3.4 Discussion
How do our results compare with previous evidence? A few studies provide estimates of the
average market value loss associated with pollution accidents. Overall, the magnitude of their
estimates, both in percentage and dollar value terms, does not substantially differ from ours.18
[26] consider a sample of 18 accidents (namely, gas leaks, explosions, chemical and oil
spills) caused in 1989 and 1990 by companies listed on the NYSE and AMEX. The abnormal
drop in stock returns amounts to -1.50% over three days around the announcement, while the
average dollar value loss is $360 million (the median is $95 million). [34] builds a sample of 14
pollution events taken from The Wall Street Journal Index from 1989 to 1993. Three categories
are considered: air pollution, water pollution, and environmental pollution & cleanup. The
average abnormal return is equal to -5.3% on the announcement day and -2.78% in the first
month (significant at the 5% level).19 [20] study pollution news about electric power and oil
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firms reported in The Wall Street Journal between 1970 and 1992. Their sample includes 14
pollution incidents (namely, radioactive release, spills, including the Exxon-Valdez oil spill and
the Three Mile Island accident) as well as 84 lawsuits or settlements for environmental violations.
On average, in the first two days, the loss associated with the 14 pollution accidents is equal to
-1.27%, while the average dollar value loss is about $180 million.20 However, their estimates are
not significantly different from zero. It is worth noting that these studies investigate accidents
that occurred in the U.S. and mainly focused on the 70s and 80s. Moreover, they use relatively
small samples of accidents and only look at the very short-term.
A number of single case studies have examined catastrophic events that raised major envi-
ronmental concerns.21 [35] finds that the equity value of Union Carbide decreased by 27% in
the first month (from $3.5 to $2.5 billion) after the Bhopal explosion in 1984. [18] find that
Exxon experienced a significant negative cumulative abnormal return of -8.89% over three weeks
following the Valdez oil spill, and White (1996) reports that within 120 days, the abnormal
shareholder loss was significantly different from zero and equal to 20%.22 Needless to say, those
accidents are rare exceptions, and no statistical inference can be drawn from a single case study.
It is worth noting that our estimates in percentage value appear small by comparison with the
ones found in the literature on the Bhopal explosion and the Exxon-Valdez oil spill. For the 10%
worst accidents in terms of deaths in our sample, the median abnormal loss is equal to -1.6%
over three days and -3.3% over six months. For instance, the two most dramatic accidents in
our sample are: i) the explosion of a BP refinery on March 23, 2005 in Texas, that killed 15
workers and injured more than 170 people; and ii) the explosion of the AZF-Total agrochemical
plant on September 21, 2001 in France, that killed 30 people, injured 2,500 more and affected
over 10,000 homes. Those accidents are associated with a market value loss equal to $3 billion
in the first days, which represents about 3% of the companies’ market value. Finally, for the
accidents that caused a toxic release, the median abnormal loss amounts to -1% over three days
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and -6.4% over six months.
Several factors could explain why shareholders’ reaction appears to be smaller in percentage
value in our sample. First, accidents might have less dramatic consequences due to stricter safety
and environmental regulation and larger insurance coverage.23 Second, accidents might be less
of a surprise for investors because transparency about the riskiness of the firms has increased.
Finally, the smaller loss in percentage value can be explained by an increase in the firms’ market
value. In the following section, we provide cross-sectional evidence to further investigate the
determinants of the shareholder loss both in terms of percentage and dollar value.
4 How to explain the stock market response to chemical disas-
ters?
In this section, multivariate regressions are used to relate cross-sectional differences in the loss
incurred by shareholders (as measured by abnormal returns and the associated market value
loss) to the accident’s features. Table 7 and Table 8 report the results from OLS regressions
(using White-corrected standard errors) for the following two dependent variables: the cumula-
tive abnormal returns and the shareholder loss up to t days after the disaster (CARi,[0;+t] and
SLi,[0;+t] for i = 1, ..., 64).
The first explanatory variable is the total number of fatalities and serious injuries. The second
variable of interest is a dummy set equal to 1 if accidents released toxic chemicals. A number
of variables of control are included: the number of previous chemical disasters experienced by
the firm since 1980; the log of the market value on the day before the accident; the abnormal
media coverage received by each firm shortly before the accident; a dummy set equal to one if the
accident was reported in either The Wall Street Journal or The Financial Times ; a dummy set
equal to one if the firm belongs to the chemical sector, and zero if it belongs to the oil industry;
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several dummy variables for accident years between 1995 and 1999, and for accidents after
2000; and four country dummy variables for accidents that happened in the United Kingdom,
in continental Europe, in Japan and in emerging countries. First, we considered all variables,
and then we dropped one by one the non-significant variables, with the exception of the country
dummies. Model specifications are able to explain between 25% and 30% of the shareholder loss
variance in the first days following the accident, as measured by the adjusted R-squared metric.
4.1 Short-term evidence
We first attempt to explain the magnitude of the shareholder loss in the first days after the
accident (see columns (1)-(4) of Table 7 and Table 8). In what follows, we mainly comment the
specifications in columns (4) of Table 7 and Table 8.
Our first result is that the human cost of an accident, as measured by the total number of
fatalities and serious injuries, increases equity value losses. Since the shareholder loss dependant
variable is measured in billions, one more fatality or serious injury results in an additional market
value loss of $164 million (and of 0.21% in terms of cumulative abnormal returns) over three days
after the accident date, significant at the 5% level.24 More specifically, there is a 95% chance
that the true population parameter lies in the interval of [-$242;-$86] million per casualty. To our
knowledge, no previous study has estimated the implications of workplace fatalities in hazardous
industries in a multivariate regression framework. There are however various studies on airplane
crashes. For instance, [5] examine a sample of 67 U.S. commercial airplane crashes from 1960
to 1985. Using cross-section regression analysis, they find that the equity value loss per fatality
(or serious injury) is of $38,000 in 1985 dollar terms.25
Our second result is that firms that release a toxic chemical (often provoking the evacuation
of thousands of persons) do incur losses of greater magnitude. All else being equal, the difference
in shareholder losses between accidents with and without toxic release is equal to $1 billion (and
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to 1.7% in terms of cumulative abnormal returns) over three days after the accident, significant
at the 5% level. This population parameter has also a large standard-error, so that there is a
95% chance that the population value stemming from any random draw of chemical accidents
lies in the interval [-$1.82;-$0.19] billion. This is not surprising given that the dummy cannot
capture the severity of the toxic release. Notice that [24] find that in the United States, the
average fine and damage award for environmental violations over the period 1980-2000 is equal
to $13.2 million, while the compliance or remediation cost is equal to $93.2 million. But further
evidence would be needed to test the hypothesis that the expected legal penalty drives the equity
value loss associated with a toxic release.
Our third result is that the number of previous accidents experienced by each firm appears to
aggravate the drop in equity returns in the event of chemical explosions. This result suggests that
when the number of accidents previously experienced is low, investors do not update substantially
their valuation of the riskiness of the firm, while when this number is high, the firm reputation
is strongly damaged. One possible explanation is that investors are more likely to attribute the
accident to bad luck when the responsible firm has a good environmental record. All other things
being equal, this might imply a smaller stock market loss. Our result is in line with that of [33].
Using a sample of 704 judicial actions from 1977 to 1986 (385 violations on the filing date and
319 cases on the settlement date) on firms publicly listed on the NYSE, the AMEX, and the
NASDAQ, they find that the stock market penalty is more pronounced for “repeat violators”.
Finally, results in models (1)-(4) of Table 7, where the shareholder loss is given in percentage
terms, suggest that stock market losses are stronger in Japan and continental Europe compared
to the U.S. Accident-related abnormal market losses are 1.25% higher in continental Europe than
in the U.S., and 1.8% higher in Japan than in the U.S. (significant at the 10% level).
Controlling for size of firms is important. In particular, one would expect that bigger firms
are less likely to be affected by accidents in percentage terms. This hypothesis is supported by
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the data, since coefficients are significant at the 5% level in models where the dependant variable
is given in percentage terms. We also find that abnormal losses are lower for firms which are
of major concern for journalists in the period before the disaster. It appears that the abnormal
media coverage variable has a positive effect on abnormal returns, which is significant at the 5%
level. Notice that the firm’s size and the firm abnormal media coverage before the accident do
not affect the absolute value of the loss as shown in models (1) to (4) of Table 8.
Finally, other variables do not appear significant. In particular, this the case for the time
dummies, which are suited to control for increased public concern about safety and pollution
news, as illustrated by the rise of voluntary initiatives as well as greater transparency at the end
of the 1990s. It could be the case that these effects are captured by country dummies and the
reputation variable.
4.2 Long-term evidence
In columns (5)-(6) of Table 7, the dependant variable is the shareholder loss (in percentage
terms) over six months after the accident, as measured by the cumulative abnormal returns up
to 120 trading days. Using robust ordinary least squares, we document that, after six months,
the additional loss associated with pollution occurrence is 12%. This finding, which is both
statistically and economically significant at the 5% level, might reflect a premium for some
unidentified risk raised by the occurrence of pollution. By contrast, we find that the effect of the
number of serious injuries and fatalities on abnormal returns in the long-term is not significantly
different from zero.
We also find that firms associated with bad environmental records are more strongly penalized
on stock markets, even six months after the accident, as the number of previous accidents
experienced by each firm significantly aggravates the shareholder loss. Finally, as in the short-
term, we observe that firms which experience an accident in the U.S incur abnormal losses of
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lower magnitude than firms that experience an accident in the other countries. One possible
explanation is that in the U.S., possibly due to stricter regulation and better transparency,
investors are more confident about the riskiness of the firm and, consequently, react less after
a disaster. These results confirm previous studies arguing that the strength of governmental
regulation is an important predictor of the stock market response to a broad set of pollution
news. In particular, [8], [9], and [14] show that stock market losses following the publication of
pollution records by governmental authorities or by the press in developing countries are more
pronounced than in the U.S. and Canada.
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5 Conclusion
This paper examines the financial cost incurred by firms responsible for industrial disasters. To
do this, we built an original dataset of 64 explosions in the petrochemical industry over the
period 1990-2005. A quarter of the accidents in our sample resulted in a toxic release, and half
of them caused at least one death or serious injury.
Our results show that the stock market reacts negatively (and instantaneously) after the
accident. On average, we find that shareholders suffer a significant loss of about -1.3% over
the two days following a disaster. Multivariate analysis finds that losses in the first days are
strongly related to the seriousness of the accident. One fatality or serious injury is associated
with an additional loss of $164 million, while the occurrence of a toxic release corresponds to an
additional drop of around $1 billion. We also observe that stock market losses are more severe
for firms that have bad environmental and safety records. This result suggests that investors
are less likely to change their belief about the riskiness of a firm when the number of accidents
previously experienced is low.
We also study the stock abnormal returns over longer event windows and find that accidents
that caused a toxic release are associated with higher losses than non-polluting accidents. More-
over, we show that this difference increases over time. The latter result suggests that investors
might be slow to recognize the extent of the loss after a polluting accident, possibly due to
greater legal uncertainty or to lack of information with regard to the seriousness of the accident
in the very short-term.
Since we have shown that losses are proportional to the social cost of the accident, our results
provide some support to the idea that stock markets improve incentives for risk mitigation.
However, it remains questionable whether the magnitude of the expected drop, as evidenced in
our study, represents a serious threat for managers and provides sufficient incentives to improve
20
environmental and occupational safety. This important topic is beyond the scope of this paper
and is left for future research.
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Table 1: Stock market reaction to industrial accidents with environmental consequences
Study Event Sample Main results
Klassen & Various envir’l 18 events Gas leaks, explosion, chemical and oil spills. CAR[−1;+1] = −1.50%
∗∗∗ ($390 million).
McLaughlin (1996) (US, 1989-90) NYSE/AMEX
Rao (1996) Wall Street J. 14 events AAR0 = −5.29%
∗∗; AAR1 = −2.78%
∗∗
(US, 1989-93) 14 firms
Jones & Various envir’l 14 events Radioactive release, spills (including Exxon-Valdez and the TMI accident)
Rubin (2001) (US, 1970-92) oil/electric Pollution accidents only (authors’s computation): CAAR[−1;0] = −1.27% ($180 million).
Bowen, Castanias TMI 83 Electric Whole sample: CAAR[0;+5] = −.69%; CAAR[0;+29] = −4.14%
& Daley (1983) (US, 1979) utilities Babcock & Wilcox: CAAR[0;+5] = −2.09%; CAAR[0;+29] = −6.89%
Nuclear (large; small): CAAR[0;+5] = −2.11%; −.96%; CAAR[0;+29] = −7.18%; −5.68%
Nonnuclear: CAAR[0;+5] = .82%;CAAR[0;+29] = −1.01%
Hill & TMI 64 Electric GPU: ARMarch = −10.9%
∗∗; CARMarch−April = −45.5%
∗∗
Schneeweis (1983) (US, 1979) utilities 34 nuclear; 30 non-nuclear: AARMarch = −6.1%
∗∗; −3.9%; CAARMarch−April = −12.0%
∗∗; −6.6%
Barrett, Heuson TMI 76 Electric The bond risk premia for all electric utilities increased.
& Kolb (1986) (US, 1979) utilities The impact is larger for firms with nuclear capacity.
Spudeck & TMI 62 Electric There was an increase in systematic risk for utilities with nuclear facilities in operation in 1979.
Moyer (1989) (US, 1979) utilities The impact of regulatory activity was usually underestimated.
Fields & Chernobyl 89 Electric Whole sample: AAR0 = −1.00%
∗∗; CAAR[−10;+20] = −7.96%
∗∗∗
Janjigian (1989) (USSR, 1986) utilities 57 nuclear; 32 non-nuclear: AAR0 = −1.05%
∗∗; −.93%∗; CAAR[−10;+20] = −8.84%
∗∗∗; −6.40%∗∗
Kalra, Henderson Chernobyl 69 Electric 20 nuclear; 33 non-nuclear; 16 mixed: AAR0 = −1.5%; −1.2%; −2.7%
& Raines (1993) (USSR, 1986) utilities CAAR[−1;+5] = −1.1%; .1%; −4.4%; CAAR[−1;+28] = −1.3%; .9% ; −11.1%;
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Study Event Sample Main results
Salinger (1992) Bhopal Union Carbide December 84: CAR = −31.5%∗∗∗; January 85: CAR = −22.0%∗∗; December 85: CAR = 8.9%
(India, 1984)
Blacconiere & Bhopal 47 firms Union Carbide: CAR[0,+2] ≃ −8%
∗∗∗; CAR[0,+5] ≃ −31%
∗∗∗; CAR[0;+10] ≃ −35%
∗∗∗
Patten (1994) (India, 1984) (chemicals) Other chemicals: CAAR[0,+2] = −.6%
∗∗; CAAR[0,+5] = −1.28%
∗∗; CAAR[0,+10] = −2.4%
∗
Kalra, Henderson Bhopal All US Union Carbide: AR0 = −4.3%
∗∗∗; CAR[−2;+5] = −31.1%
∗∗∗; CAR[−2;+20] = −25.7
∗∗∗%
& Raines (1995) (India, 1984) (chemicals) Hazardous: AAR0 = −.4%; CAAR[−2;+5] = −1.6%; CAAR[−2;+20] = 1.1%
Mansur, Cochran Valdez spill 14 firms Exxon: ARMarch,27 = −.89%; ARMarch,30 = −.16%; ARApril,7 = −1.26%; ARApril,10 = −1.69%
∗∗
& Phillips (1991) (Alaska, 1989) (petroleum) All: AARMarch,27 = .02%; AARMarch,30 = −.22%; AARApril,7 = −.06%; AARApril,10 = −.20%
Jones, Jones & Valdez spill Exxon Shareholders lost between $4.7 and $11.3 billion depending on the length of the event window.
Phillips-Patrick (1994) (Alaska, 1989) The decline is the highest on July 24, when Exxon announced an $850 million charge.
Herbst, Marshall Valdez spill 13 firms Exxon: AR0 = −.05%; CAR[0;+4] = −2.98%; CAR[0;+9] = −6.33
∗∗%; CAR[0;+15] = −8.89
∗∗%
& Wingender (1996) (Alaska, 1989) (petroleum) All 13: AAR0 = .37%; CAAR[0;+4] = −.41%; CAAR[0;+9] = −.12%; CAAR[0;+15] = −.03%
Big 5: AAR0 = −.51%; CAAR[0;+4] = −.42%; CAAR[0;+9] = −.34%; CAAR[0;+15] = −.52%
No significant change in Exxon’s relative stock price volatility.
White (1996) Valdez spill 55 firms Exxon: AR0 = −.49%; CAR[0;+30] = −12.44%
∗∗∗; CAR[0;+120] = −19.04%
∗∗
(Alaska, 1989) (petroleum) Alyeska consortium: AAR0 = .31%; CAAR[0;+30] = −4.60%; CAR[0;+120] = −2.59%
Exxon competitors: AAR0 = .16%; CAAR[0;+30] = −1.67%; CAR[0;+120] = −3.77%
Note: AR = Abnormal Returns; AAR = Average AR; CAAR = Cumulative AAR. TMI = Three Mile Island.
*, **, *** denote statistically significance at the 10%, 5%, 1 % level, respectively.
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Table 2: List of accidents and main features
Date Firm Listing Accident # Serious Dummy = # print Sales
Country Country injuries and 1 if Toxic media in USD
fatalities release articles million
03/20/90 Royal Dutch Ptl. NL UK 0 1 12 66.79
05/26/90 Daiichi Pharm. JAP JAP 7 0 5 1.49
07/19/90 BASF GER USA 5 0 23 32.81
03/12/91 Union Carbide USA USA 1 0 25 7.62
06/17/91 Tenneco USA USA 12 0 21 NA
12/13/91 DSM NL NL 7 0 9 6.16
02/10/92 BP UK UK 3 0 15 49.31
04/22/92 Elf Aquitaine FRA FRA 1 0 1 37.05
04/22/92 Air Liquide FRA FRA 1 0 1 5.87
09/08/92 Akzo Nobel NL NL 1 0 2 9.26
11/09/92 Total FRA FRA 6 0 22 26.41
01/26/93 Lubrizol USA USA 0 1 1 1.54
02/22/93 Hoechst GER GER 0 1 4 26.26
03/15/93 Hoechst GER GER 2 1 24 26.26
05/02/93 Dow Chemicals USA GER 1 0 1 18.97
05/03/93 Marathon Oil USA USA 0 0 1 12.78
07/04/93 Sumitomo Chemical JAP JAP 1 0 28 9.11
08/02/93 Exxon Mobil USA USA 3 1 18 100.03
04/08/94 Olin USA USA 0 0 3 2.42
05/27/94 Royal Dutc Ptl. NL USA 3 0 62 58.99
06/04/94 BP UK FRA 4 0 4 54.66
08/08/94 Exxon Mobil USA USA 0 0 32 97.82
10/15/94 Rohm Haas USA USA 0 1 3 3.27
04/04/95 Crompton USA CAN 1 0 5 0.59
08/16/95 Ashland USA USA 0 0 1 9.46
08/20/95 Du Pont De Nemours USA USA 0 1 8 34.04
11/21/95 Lyondell Chemical USA USA 0 0 2 3.86
12/05/95 Ak Steel Hdg. USA USA 1 0 19 NA
12/05/95 FMC USA USA 0 1 19 4.01
12/29/95 Mitsubishi Chem. JAP JAP 1 0 2 10.45
01/27/96 Hoechst GER GER 1 1 13 33.33
04/01/96 Crompton USA USA 1 0 3 0.66
07/17/96 Mitsui Chemicals JAP JAP 1 0 9 3.11
10/03/96 Albright & Wilson UK UK 0 1 26 1.19
11/17/96 FMC USA USA 0 0 6 4.51
12/04/96 FMC USA USA 0 0 2 4.51
12/22/96 Wyman Gordon USA USA 8 0 68 0.40
04/04/97 Du Pont De Nemours USA JAP 0 0 2 38.35
04/04/97 Mitsui Chemicals JAP JAP 0 0 2 3.01
12/23/98 Sumitomo Chemical JAP JAP 0 0 2 8.98
06/08/99 Bayer GER GER 0 1 14 28.28
03/23/00 Royal Dutch Ptl. NL GER 0 0 1 55.53
06/07/00 BP UK UK 0 0 30 77.21
06/10/00 BP UK UK 0 1 41 77.21
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09/03/00 Total FRA FRA 0 0 3 39.21
10/12/00 Solutia USA GER 0 0 4 2.83
12/09/00 Exxon Mobil USA SG 3 0 8 160.90
04/25/01 Rhodia FRA FRA 1 0 1 6.61
07/14/01 Total FRA USA 3 1 79 102.10
09/21/01 Total FRA FRA 30 0 267 102.10
03/12/02 Asahi Kasei JAP JAP 0 1 42 10.70
09/03/02 Guerbet FRA FRA 0 0 0 0.22
01/08/03 Rhodia FRA FRA 0 1 2 8.35
01/12/03 Marathon Oil USA USA 0 0 14 31.46
02/21/03 Exxon Mobil USA USA 3 0 108 178.90
08/13/03 DSM NL AUS 2 0 9 7.11
08/14/03 Repsol YPF SP SP 10 0 46 44.85
02/22/04 Lonza Group SW SW 0 0 9 1.98
03/31/04 BP UK USA 0 0 74 272.80
06/11/04 Crompton USA CAN 0 0 15 2.18
08/25/04 LG Petrochemical SK SK 2 0 8 1.21
09/01/04 Sasol SA SA 10 0 64 11.48
01/04/05 Yara NOR FRA 0 0 0 6.37
03/23/05 BP UK USA 15 0 836 266.70
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for the sample of accidents in the petro-chemical in-
dustry
The sample is composed of 64 accidents in the petrochemical industry over the period 1990-2005. Acci-
dents are identified using the software Factiva. Only publicly listed firms are considered.
Expected
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max effect on
stock value
Variables of interest
Ser. injuries and fatalities 2.36 1 4.76 0 30 < 0
Toxic release 0.23 0 0.43 0 1 < 0
# previous accidents 2.69 1.50 3.42 0 16 ?
Variables of control
Market value (billion, 2005$) 43.36 7.28 74.04 0.10 340.05 ?
Abnormal Media Coverage 0.06 0.05 0.03 0 0.2 ?
Chemicals 0.68 1 0.47 0 1 ?
1994 <Accident date< 2000 0.28 0 0.45 0 1 ?
Accident date> 1999 0.36 0 0.48 0 1 ?
Country of listing
US 0.36 0 0.48 0 1 ?
Continental Europe 0.32 0 0.47 0 1 ?
Japan 0.11 0 0.31 0 1 ?
Emerging countries 0.06 0 0.24 0 1 ?
Country of accident
US 0.39 0 0.49 0 1 ?
Continental Europe 0.33 0 0.47 0 1 ?
Japan 0.12 0 0.33 0 1 ?
Emerging countries 0.06 0 0.24 0 1 ?
Abbreviations: Ser. injuries and fatalities: Number of serious injuries or fatalities; Toxic release = 1 if the accident
caused a toxic release and 0 otherwise; # previous accident: Number of previous accidents experienced by the
firm (in our database) since the 1980s; Abnormal Media Coverage: ratio of headlines mentioning the firm over
twenty days before disasters to the total number of headlines received in the previous year; Accident Date> 1999
= 1 if the accident occurred after 1999 and 0 otherwise. See the text for further details concerning the sample
and the variables.
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Table 4: Abnormal returns following accidents in the petrochemical industry by firms
This table reports cumulative abnormal return (CARt) up to the specified day t in event time. Event time is days relative to the accident date (mm/dd/yy).
Abnormal returns are computed given the market model parameters which are estimated with OLS through the period [-190; -10] in event time. The sample period
is from 1990 to 2005.
Date Firm t = 0 t = 1 t = 5 t = 120 Date Firm t = 0 t = 1 t = 5 t = 120
03/20/90 ROYAL DUTCH PTL. 0.09 -0.21 -0.46 4.00 07/17/96 MITSUI CHEMICALS 0.04 0.69 -0.89 -25.29
05/26/90 DAIICHI PHARM. -2.46 -3.91 -5.05 17.03 10/03/96 ALBRIGHT&WILSON 0.54 0.98 2.98 -45.90
07/19/90 BASF -0.88 -0.94 -3.10 -4.07 11/17/96 FMC -0.37 -0.52 0.42 -14.10
03/12/91 UNION CARBIDE -3.72 -4.19 -10.80 5.32 12/04/96 FMC -0.22 -0.89 -4.10 -13.50
06/17/91 TENNECO -0.66 -2.61 -4.02 -25.49 12/22/96 WYMAN GORDON -6.27 -6.60 -1.99 3.41
12/13/91 DSM -0.43 -0.92 -5.90 17.97 04/04/97 DU PONT DE NEMOURS -0.12 -4.20 -2.71 -47.52
02/10/92 BP 2.80 3.09 -5.02 -12.79 04/04/97 MITSUI CHEMICALS -1.66 -2.11 -5.48 -11.58
04/22/92 ELF AQUITAINE -0.27 1.58 0.26 10.20 12/23/98 SUMITOMO CHEMICAL -0.14 -3.44 -1.40 -18.26
04/22/92 AIR LIQUIDE 0.42 -1.53 1.84 4.26 06/08/99 BAYER -1.40 -2.62 -0.74 -10.33
09/08/92 AKZO NOBEL -0.69 -0.63 2.53 -6.93 03/23/00 ROYAL DUTCH PTL. -1.47 -2.33 0.63 17.75
11/09/92 TOTAL -1.08 -1.54 -0.37 6.94 06/07/00 BP -2.50 -0.14 1.31 -3.78
01/26/93 LUBRIZOL 1.02 -0.49 1.40 21.54 06/10/00 BP -0.30 1.25 1.21 -8.90
02/22/93 HOECHST -0.96 -2.77 -4.43 -16.69 09/03/00 TOTAL 2.93 2.95 8.28 -13.56
03/15/93 HOECHST -1.30 -1.98 0.80 -5.74 10/12/00 SOLUTIA -0.41 1.26 -1.98 17.52
05/02/93 DOW CHEMICALS 0.35 0.59 -0.94 12.20 12/09/00 EXXON MOBIL -3.23 -2.42 -3.19 -14.08
05/03/93 MARATHON OIL 0.91 3.32 1.35 5.89 04/25/01 RHODIA -3.29 -7.35 -2.23 -56.96
07/04/93 SUMITOMO CHEMICAL -2.35 -0.96 -0.60 13.37 07/14/01 TOTAL -0.85 -0.98 -1.27 -1.16
08/02/93 EXXON MOBIL 0.28 -1.03 -2.07 -7.29 09/21/01 TOTAL -3.74 -3.21 1.35 -3.22
04/08/94 OLIN -0.05 -0.93 1.19 6.98 03/12/02 ASAHI KASEI -0.20 -3.03 1.08 0.67
05/27/94 ROYAL DUTCH PTL. -0.11 -0.09 0.51 -2.75 09/03/02 GUERBET -3.14 -4.92 -14.83 -20.67
06/04/94 BP -0.98 -1.75 0.06 -10.24 01/08/03 RHODIA -2.95 -7.18 -3.89 -25.05
08/08/94 EXXON MOBIL 1.22 -0.84 0.98 11.29 01/12/03 MARATHON OIL 0.75 1.26 3.76 28.13
10/15/94 ROHM&HAAS -0.57 -0.92 2.32 -7.62 02/21/03 EXXON MOBIL 0.32 1.51 0.41 -11.73
04/04/95 CROMPTON -1.05 -1.76 1.44 -10.10 08/13/03 DSM -0.30 -2.03 -1.68 -6.91
08/16/95 ASHLAND -0.79 -0.98 -1.92 12.04 08/14/03 REPSOL YPF 0.53 0.48 1.80 -6.25
08/20/95 DU PONT DE NEMOURS 1.00 -0.28 -0.06 3.01 02/22/04 LONZA GROUP -1.75 -1.79 -0.13 -3.26
11/21/95 LYONDELL CHEMICAL -0.80 0.12 0.16 28.77 03/31/04 BP 0.36 -0.30 3.93 9.54
12/05/95 AK STEEL HDG. -0.03 -1.37 -2.99 -19.67 06/11/04 CROMPTON 0.14 0.66 1.81 74.70
12/05/95 FMC -1.13 -3.00 -1.83 -0.19 08/25/04 LG PETROCHEMICAL -1.28 -1.41 -3.15 -22.18
12/29/95 MITSUBISHI CHEMICAL 0.09 0.18 -1.85 7.04 09/01/04 SASOL -1.60 -0.51 -2.47 -9.88
01/27/96 HOECHST -1.02 -0.87 0.38 1.10 01/04/05 YARA INTERNATIONAL -3.71 -5.69 -7.57 -4.59
04/01/96 CROMPTON -1.78 -0.98 -3.79 17.38 03/23/05 BP -1.30 -2.16 -2.73 1.03
Note: Statistically significant at the 5% level in bold. Statistically significant at the 10% level in italic.
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Figure 1: Abnormal Returns with Confidence Intervals at the 5% level
(a) Average abnormal returns (in %) (b) Cumulative average abnormal returns (in %)
Notes: Abnormal returns are computed given the market model parameters estimated with OLS through the
period [-190; -10] in event time. Event time is days relative to the accident date. The sample is composed of 64
accidents in the petrochemical industry over the period 1990-2005.
33
Table 5: Abnormal returns following accidents in the petrochemical industry
This table reports cumulative average abnormal return (CAARt) up to the specified day t in event time (in
%). Event time is days relative to the accident date. Abnormal returns are computed given the market model
parameters which are estimated with OLS through the period [-190; -10] in event time. CARit < 0 is the
percentage of firms i with a negative CARit. Panel A: All accidents. Panel B: Accidents which cause statistically
significant negative CARit,t<10 at the 5% level. Panel C: Panel A less Panel B. The sample period is from 1990
to 2005.
Panel A: 64 events Panel B: 10 events Panel C: 54 events
t CAARt t-stat CARit < 0 CAARt t-stat CARit < 0 CAARt t-stat CARit < 0
0 -0.76*** -3.75 71% -2.08*** -4.35 90% -0.51** -2.28 68%
1 -1.26*** -4.40 76% -3.46*** -5.10 90% -0.84*** -2.68 74%
2 -1.09*** -3.12 63% -4.00*** -4.82 90% -0.54 -1.41 58%
3 -1.17*** -2.88 63% -4.53*** -4.72 100% -0.53 -1.20 57%
4 -1.02** -2.26 63% -3.99*** -3.73 100% -0.46 -0.93 57%
5 -0.99** -2.01 57% -3.93*** -3.35 90% -0.44 -0.81 51%
6 -0.83 -1.54 61% -4.22*** -3.33 90% -0.19 -0.32 57%
7 -0.78 -1.37 57% -4.88*** -3.60 90% -0.01 -0.02 51%
8 -0.65 -1.06 50% -4.97*** -3.46 90% 0.17 0.25 43%
9 -0.71 -1.10 53% -4.87*** -3.22 80% 0.08 0.11 49%
10 -0.60 -0.90 52% -4.64*** -2.92 80% 0.16 0.22 47%
20 -1.11 -1.20 60% -5.26** -2.39 80% -0.33 -0.33 57%
40 -1.80 -1.37 66% -5.65* -1.75 80% -1.09 -0.76 64%
60 -2.07 -1.29 62% -6.44 -1.63 90% -1.26 -0.73 58%
80 -2.13 -1.16 64% -4.28 -0.94 80% -1.71 -0.85 62%
100 -2.78 -1.35 58% -7.85 -1.55 80% -1.86 -0.83 55%
120 -2.70 -1.20 58% -12.59** -2.27 70% -0.97 -0.40 57%
Note: *, **, *** denote statistically significance at the 10%, the 5% and the 1 % level, respectively.
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Table 6: Difference in long term abnormal returns following accidents in the petrochemical industry
This table reports cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR[0;+t]) up to the specified day t in event time (in %). Event time is days relative to the accident
date. Abnormal returns are computed given the market model parameters which are estimated with OLS through the period [-190; -10] in event time. % < 0 is the
percentage of firms i with a negative CARi,t. For each test, accidents are split in two sub-samples: i) according to the number of fatalities and serious injuries; ii)
with or without toxic release. The mean comparison test rests on the Z-stat computed with the estimated abnormal return variance. The Z-stat is built using the
historical variance of abnormal returns during the estimation period [-190,-10] in event-time. The sample is composed of 64 accidents in the petrochemical industry
over the period 1990-2005.
Fatalities and
serious injuries Yes (N = 33) No (N = 31) Mean test
t CAAR[0;+t] Std.Dev. % < 0 CAAR[0;+t] Std.Dev. % < 0 Diff. Z-stat
10 −1.05% 0.83 53% −0.14% 1.05 52% −0.91 −3.79∗∗∗
20 −1.27% 1.15 63% −0.95% 1.46 58% −0.32 −0.95
40 −0.95% 1.61 63% −2.67% 2.07 70% 1.72 3.64∗∗∗
60 −3.07% 1.96 69% −0.95% 2.52 57% −2.12 −3.68∗∗∗
80 −3.56% 2.26 72% −0.58% 2.91 57% −2.98 −4.48∗∗∗
100 −4.0%1 2.53 66% −1.44% 3.25 50% −2.57 −3.47∗∗∗
120 −4.10% 2.77 63% −1.19% 3.56 53% −2.92 −3.59∗∗∗
Toxic release Yes (N = 15) No (N = 49) Mean test
t CAAR[0;+t] Std.Dev. % < 0 CAAR[0;+t] Std.Dev. % < 0 Diff. Z-stat
10 −1.10% 1.32 53% −0.44% 0.77 52% −0.66% −1.83∗
20 −1.46% 1.83 60% −1.00% 1.07 60% −0.46% −0.92
40 −3.27% 2.55 67% −1.33% 1.51 66% −1.94% −2.78∗∗∗
60 −4.05% 3.11 67% −1.43% 1.84 62% −2.62% −3.07∗∗∗
80 −5.74% 3.59 80% −0.98% 2.12 60% −4.76% −4.86∗∗∗
100 −8.37% 4.01 67% −1.00% 2.37 55% −7.37% −6.75∗∗∗
120 −7.86% 4.39 67% −1.07% 2.60 55% −6.79% −5.68∗∗∗
Note: *, **, *** denote statistically significance at the 10%, the 5% and the 1 % level, respectively.
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Table 7: Determinants of Abnormal Returns Following Accidents in the Petro-
chemical Industry
This table reports results from least squares regressions (using White-corrected standard errors). The dependent
variable is the Cumulative Abnormal Returns up to t days following the disaster: CARi,[0;+t] for i = 1, ..., 64 and
t = 1, 2 and t = 120. Abnormal returns are computed using the market model. Models (5) and (6) also include a
set of monthly dummies. The sample is composed of 64 accidents in the petrochemical industry over the period
1990-2005. Accidents are identified using the software Factiva.
CAR[0;+1] CAR[0;+1] CAR[0;+2] CAR[0;+2] CAR[0;+120] CAR[0;+120]
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant −1.549∗∗ −1.674∗∗∗ −2.620∗∗ −2.045∗∗∗ 23.998 16.779∗
[0.731] [0.485] [1.219] [0.707] [17.309] [8.590]
Fatalities and serious injuries −0.128∗∗ −0.120∗∗∗ −0.216∗∗∗ −0.216∗∗∗ 0.044 0.258
[0.051] [0.042] [0.067] [0.057] [0.362] [0.313]
Toxic release −1.846∗∗∗ −1.724∗∗∗ −2.047∗∗ −1.860∗∗ −10.551∗ −12.412∗∗
[0.598] [0.575] [0.867] [0.824] [5.518] [4.683]
# Previous accidents −0.183∗ −0.167∗∗ −0.170 −0.163 −2.252∗∗ −2.332∗∗∗
[0.093] [0.071] [0.137] [0.121] [0.926] [0.854]
Market value ($2005, log) 0.590∗∗∗ 0.591∗∗∗ 0.685∗∗ 0.608∗∗ −0.780 0.054
[0.194] [0.177] [0.262] [0.251] [2.004] [1.504]
Abnormal media coverage 0.169∗ 0.182∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗ −0.158
[0.098] [0.085] [0.112] [0.099] [0.814]
Financial press dummy 0.638 0.494 8.213
[0.573] [0.752] [6.124]
Chemical industry 0.101 0.362 −1.724
[0.784] [1.153] [10.331]
1994 <Accident year< 2000 −0.338 0.370 −11.687∗
[0.638] [0.869] [6.522]
Accident year> 1999 −0.593 −0.260 −4.093
[0.585] [0.791] [10.306]
Japan −2.066∗∗∗ −1.875∗∗ −1.860∗ −1.517 −11.968 −15.153∗∗
[0.734] [0.726] [0.978] [0.964] [8.565] [7.336]
Continental Europe −1.125∗ −1.138∗ −1.318 −1.455∗ −16.347∗∗ −12.910∗
[0.571] [0.588] [0.811] [0.796] [7.199] [7.082]
UK 1.187 1.297 1.236 1.187 −23.421∗∗ −18.231∗∗
[0.840] [0.823] [1.034] [0.936] [10.656] [8.976]
Emerging countries −0.592 −0.875 0.675 0.343 −25.102∗∗∗ −21.559∗∗∗
[1.196] [1.071] [1.206] [0.927] [8.489] [7.347]
Accident 6=listing country −0.722 −0.900 −1.403 −1.549∗ 8.977 5.200
[0.650] [0.620] [0.885] [0.844] [7.899] [7.188]
N 64 64 64 64 64 64
Log pseudolikelihood −124.3 −125.9 −141.7 −142.4 −253.6 −256.9
F-stat 4.2∗∗∗ 4.4∗∗∗ 7.6∗∗∗ 7.9∗∗∗ 1.7∗ 1.9∗∗
Adj. R-squared (%) 24.5 26.6 22.0 26.3 11.3 13.3
Note: Robust standard-errors are in brackets: *, **, *** denote statistically significance at the 10%, the 5% and
the 1 % level, respectively.
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Table 8: Determinants of Abnormal Shareholder Losses Following Accidents in the
Petro-chemical Industry
This table reports results from least squares regressions (using White-corrected standard errors). The dependent
variable is the Shareholder Loss up to the second day following the disaster: SLi,[0;+t] = CARi,[0;+t]×MVi,−1 for
i = 1, ..., 64 and t = 1, 2 and where MVi,−1 represents the market value on the day before the accident date (in
billion dollar). Abnormal returns are computed using the market model. The sample is composed of 64 accidents
in the petrochemical industry over the period 1990-2005. Accidents are identified using the software Factiva.
SL[0;+1] SL[0;+1] SL[0;+2] SL[0;+2]
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 1.281∗ 0.494∗ 0.215 0.647∗∗
[0.652] [0.263] [0.804] [0.273]
Fatalities and serious injuries −0.104∗∗ −0.107∗∗∗ −0.167∗∗∗ −0.164∗∗∗
[0.044] [0.039] [0.061] [0.039]
Toxic release −0.410 −0.529∗∗ −1.142∗ −1.005∗∗
[0.329] [0.260] [0.588] [0.406]
# Previous accidents −0.106 −0.053
[0.077] [0.103]
Market value ($2005, log) −0.083 0.112
[0.188] [0.181]
Abnormal media coverage 0.017 0.072
[0.045] [0.062]
Financial press dummy −0.067 −0.322
[0.335] [0.485]
Chemical industry −0.419 0.255
[0.499] [0.692]
1994 <Accident date< 2000 −0.401 −0.156
[0.263] [0.353]
Accident date> 1999 0.230 0.084
[0.428] [0.567]
Japan −0.410 −0.400 −0.269 −0.208
[0.343] [0.243] [0.403] [0.324]
Continental Europe −0.208 0.057 0.010 0.090
[0.361] [0.344] [0.521] [0.513]
UK 0.771 0.788 1.141 1.137∗∗
[0.784] [0.600] [0.909] [0.501]
Emerging countries −2.582 −2.027 −0.410 −0.340
[2.041] [1.901] [1.137] [0.731]
Accident 6=listing country −1.332∗∗∗ −1.408∗∗∗ −1.776∗∗∗ −1.637∗∗∗
[0.483] [0.459] [0.646] [0.570]
N 64 64 64 64
Log pseudolikelihood −97.8 −101.4 −109.8 −111.8
F-stat 1.6∗ 2.7∗∗∗ 3.1∗∗∗ 5.7∗∗∗
Adj. R-squared (%) 29.2 30.7 24.0 29.2
Note: Robust standard-errors are in brackets: *, **, *** denote statistically significance at the 10%, the 5% and
the 1 % level, respectively.
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Notes
1Data are taken from the tenth environmental assessment report of the European Environ-
mental Agency available at http://www.eea.europa.eu/.
2See also M.A. White, Investor Response to the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, Working Paper,
University of Virginia Charlottesville (1996).
3In Table 1, we also summarize the empirical literature on the stock market response to
industrial disasters with environmental consequences.
4The results of this literature are not unanimous. [24] show that there is a significant loss
when charges are filed, as well as on the settlement day. But, [1] find evidence of significant
losses only on the settlement day, while [33] show that abnormal returns are significant only
on the filing date. In contrast, [17] and [20], as well as [29] for Canada, do not find significant
estimates following lawsuit filing announcements.
5In Europe, since the accident of Seveso in Italy in 1976, all firms are obliged to notify
accidents to public authorities. In the US, the Environmental Protection Agency provides a
complete list of chemical accidents that have occurred in the US since the 1990s. But, due to
a principle of commercial confidentiality, the names of companies responsible for accidents are
not usually disclosed, at least outside the US. Note that this is all set to change with recent
environmental policies aimed at disclosing pollution records (e.g. the REACH program for
chemicals in the European Union).
6We also attempted to proxy the social cost of accidents using the number of nearby residents
that were evacuated or warned to stay indoors as a precaution, but information was too limited.
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7In principle, environmental risk at the firm level could be proxied by the participation to
voluntary initiatives such as the ISO14000 management standard, or the U.S. Global Reporting
Initiative (GRI), which provides guidelines for voluntary reporting of environmental and social
activities. Unfortunately, these programs were launched at the end of the 1990s.
8Recent and notable governmental initiatives include the EU Accounts Modernisation Direc-
tive, effective since 2005, which requires EU companies to report information on environmental
and employee matters, while private initiatives include the U.S. GRI launched in 1997.
9We also considered dummy variables for country of listing, but they were highly correlated.
To save space, we do not report the results.
10Over the years, insurers have offered comprehensive liability cover for quantifiable damages
(such as property damage and bodily injury), but they are still not able to offer coverage for
purely ecological damage (see [13] and Swiss Re, The Economics of Liability Losses - Insuring
a Moving target, Sigma No 6/2004). Besides, the market for incidental pollution insurance is
small (the total premium income for the US environmental insurance market was US$ 1 billion
in 2006, according to Munich Re).
11The event-study methodology is widely used in finance. For instance, [28] list more than 565
event studies (dealing with shares distributions, earnings and/or dividends, mergers, massive
layoffs, etc.) published between 1974 and 2000 in the five leading finance journals. The number
of papers per year increased in the 1980’s and has been quite stable since then.
12To check for robustness, we dropped the accidents when the parameter β̂i is not significant.
It does not change the results.
13Another measure of significance aggregates, into a single portfolio, the abnormal returns of
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all petrochemical companies experiencing an accident for the day of each firm’s explosion. It
then uses the daily variance of returns on this portfolio to calculate a t-statistic. This test,
however, attributes more weight to observations of firms with a high variance in returns, and is
therefore more sensitive to distortions from very noisy observations.
14Cumulative abnormal returns (CARi,t) are reported for each accident (i) in Table 4.
15In unreported results, we computed cumulative average abnormal returns using different
event window lengths. Results confirm that no abnormal losses are detected shortly before the
disaster, so that the event window is well specified on average. Moreover, we also examined
whether the price pressure was associated with a significant shift in trading volumes. We de-
fined abnormal volume as the difference between the average turnover ratio logarithm through
the period [-190; -10] and the observed turnover ratio logarithm after the disaster. We found
that abnormal trading volumes are of 9% on average on the accident day, but not statistically
significant from zero.
16This interpretation is in line with [40] who shows that investors react only gradually to news
announcements when information is more uncertain.
17Conversely, for less serious accidents, when looking at a longer event window, we expect
subsequent cumulative abnormal returns to remain unchanged or to be gradually overwhelmed
by additional news announcements.
18The previous empirical literature on the stock market response to industrial disasters with
environmental consequences (including nuclear accidents) is also summarized in Table 1.
19The author does not provide any dollar-value estimation.
20Notice that the paper by [20] only provides results for the entire sample. To make their
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analysis comparable to ours, the average abnormal return was computed by considering the
pollution accidents only.
21A few studies have also looked at nuclear accidents. [6], and [19] look at the stock market
reaction to the Three Mile Island accident, while [22] and [12] examine the Chernobyl nuclear
meltdown. Results from these studies are summarized in Table 1.
22See M.A. White, Investor Response to the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, Working Paper, University
of Virginia Charlottesville (1996).
23According to data provided by Swiss Re (see its website, www.swissre.com), the total insured
losses per year for man-made disasters (which includes fires and explosions, aviation disasters,
collapse of buildings/bridges, etc.) has more than tripled from 1970 to 2008. At the same
time, the number of man-made disasters covered by insurance has almost tripled. Moreover, big
petrochemical firms have created captive insurance companies to cover industrial risk.
24We also built a variable for the number of minor injuries (i.e., all injuries that are not
reported as serious), but this variable does not change the results.
25Our estimates are greater than those obtained by the labor literature that uses data on wages
in risky jobs to infer the implicit value of life. For example, in [38] the estimated value of one life
falls between $3 and $9 million. This is not surprising given that the number of fatalities proxies
for a wide range of uninsured costs (reduced productivity, insurance premiums, compensation
claims, damaged reputation, legal implications and punitive damages).
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